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ABSTRACT
This paper examines whether the mother’s rank (whether she is a senior or junior wife) in
polygamous households in Côte d’Ivoire injects favoritism that could lead to differential investment
in children (based on mother’s rank), a concern that could cause an inefficient allocation of
household resources. The hypothesis is that the younger is a junior wife relative to the senior wife,
the greater favoritism she will receive from the husband, and the better her children will fare. This
question is analyzed employing Ordinary Least Squares on a Living Standards Measurement
Survey microdataset collected by the World Bank. An interesting pattern is found: whether the
senior or junior children are advantaged depends on the age difference between the senior and
junior wife. Senior children are at an advantage when the age gap is small; however, investments
in senior children decline as this age gap increases. For example, the child of a senior wife is
nearly 4 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in school as the child of a junior wife who is
5 years younger. With an age difference of 15 years, the child of a senior wife is 9 percentage
points less likely to be enrolled. Inefficient disparities in investments of polygynous children
potentially affect not only the well-being of those children but also Côte d'Ivoire as a society. The
finding of disparity in schooling investments speaks to a role for policies that will incentivize more
rational allocations to children such as increasing women’s access to credit markets or paying
mothers to keep children in school.
Keywords: Polygamy, intrahousehold allocation, children, school enrollment.
*Corresponding author: kristin.mammen@csi.cuny.edu
JEL Classification: D13, J12, J13, J22, J24
1 INTRODUCTION
Polygyny, the practice of a man marrying multiple wives, remains widespread in sub-Saharan
Africa (Meekers, 1992; Munro, Kebede, Tarazona-Gomez, & Verschoor, 2010; Timaeus &
Reynar, 1998), with important economic implications for the societies which house it.1 Theoretical
and empirical research shows polygynous African families typically have lower socioeconomic
status than one-wife families. Child health is poorer (Amankwaa, 1996; Amey, 2002; Arthi &
Fenske, 2018; Wagner & Rieger, 2015) and child educational attainment is lower (e.g., Behaghel
& Lambert, 2017). Evidence also suggests women’s status is lower in polygynous families than
in one-wife families (Solanke, Kupoluyi, Abe, & Bankole, 2018); polygynous wives report lower
1

Polygyny denotes a man with multiple wives, polyandry a wife with multiple husbands. Polygamy
refers to both these cases.
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life satisfaction (Hinks & Davies, 2008) and suffer from poorer mental health; they experience
more domestic violence (Ickowitz & Mohanty, 2015) and are more resigned to it (Amo-Adjei &
Tuoyire, 2016; Uthman, Lawoko, & Moradi, 2009).
Polygynous households save less which may impede economic growth at the national level
(de Laiglesia & Morrisson, 2008; Gould, Moav, & Simhon, 2012; Tertilt, 2006).2 Addressing wellbeing within these families prompts questions about the intrahousehold allocation of resources
among co-wives and their children. Although Becker’s traditional microeconomic model of the
household posits that households allocate investments efficiently over members (Becker, 1993),
more recent evidence that children’s well-being is correlated with how closely related they are to
the decision-maker in the household has put the assumption of rational household decision-making
into question (e.g., Case & Paxson, 2001; Leroy, Razak, & Habicht, 2008). If the one-wife family
is inefficient, it is likely that the polygynous family is even more so. Co-wives compete vigorously
for the husband’s resources and attention for themselves and their children (Jankowiak, Sudakov,
& Wilreker, 2005) and it seems unlikely that mothers are concerned with the marginal product of
investments in their children relative to another wife’s children. Only a few studies have
investigated child outcomes within polygynous families;3 much of the existing evidence is from
small samples (e.g., Strassman, 1997). In this paper, a large microdataset from Côte d’Ivoire was
used to investigate empirically if the investments a child receives depend on the rank of his mother
– whether she is a senior (first) wife or a junior (second and higher order) wife.
In Côte d’Ivoire, as in many polygynous societies, senior wives are typically close in age to their
husbands (Clignet & Sween, 1969, Sween & Clignet, 1978) and accorded traditional privileges
which they may use to advantage their children (e.g., Clignet, 1970, p. 35). However, as a husband
ages and becomes more financially established, he can afford to marry more “socially valuable”
women as junior wives – younger, from a higher status family, or more educated than the first wife
(Clignet, 1970, p. 91, p. 242).4 A husband’s favoritism for such a junior wife may result in more
resources being allocated to her children. This cultural context makes it difficult to predict whether
senior or junior wives will have more ‘clout’; thus, it is an empirical question whether the gain, if
any, will accrue to the children of senior or junior wives. The objective of this paper is to examine
the effect of a wife’s rank on her child’s school enrollment, productive activities, and educational
attainment. The hypothesis is that the younger is a junior wife relative to the senior wife, the
greater favoritism she will receive from the husband, and the better her children will fare. The
identification assumption is that on average the children of senior and junior wives (who will be
2

A possible exception is in Senegal where Boltz and Chort (2016) find a positive effect of the risk of
polygyny – the husband marrying an additional wife – on wives’ savings.
3
Matz (2016) investigates polygynous household in rural Ethiopia and finds senior children have higher
school attendance relative to junior children. With data on wives’ characteristics at the time of marriage,
she demonstrates that wife rank correlates with ‘high productivity’ characteristics such as early marriage
and higher wealth of the wives’ origin family. Gibson and Mace (2007) find similar results for child
nutrition in Ethiopia. Kazianga and Klonner (2009) show that while senior wives in rural Mali achieve
efficient investments in their offspring, junior wives do not, due to their weak bargaining position in the
household, leading to higher mortality for junior girls relative to boys. These papers do not specifically
address how senior and junior wives’ bargaining power may change over time.
4
In 1975 the singulate mean age at marriage for women (men) was 18.4 (27.9) in Côte d’Ivoire (Pebley &
Mbugua, 1989).
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referred to as senior children and junior children) are equally productive so that if the household
is making rational allocations, the children should receive the same levels of investments, ceteris
paribus. That is, that the rank of the wife is not correlated with the productivity of her children.
The plausibility of this assumption will be discussed later in the paper.
2 DATA
2.1 Summary Statistics: Polygyny and Polygynous Households in Côte d’Ivoire
The rich data analysed here come from the Côte d’Ivoire Living Standards Survey (CILSS)
conducted from 1985 to 1988 by the Department of Statistics of Côte d’Ivoire with support from
the World Bank. 5 The CILSS records relationship to the household head for all household
members. Each individual can also be linked to his or her father, mother, and spouse if they reside
in the household. Therefore, all men, women, and children in polygynous families (marriages with
multiple wives) can be identified. The data show that polygyny is common in Côte d’Ivoire.
Table 1 presents estimates of standard demographic measures of polygyny: p is the proportion of
husbands who have more than one wife; f is the proportion of all married women who are in
polygynous marriages; m is the ratio of currently married women to currently married men; and w
is the number of wives per polygynist (Goldman & Pebley, 1989; van de Walle, 1968). About
25% of married men in the sample are polygynists, with an average of about two and a half wives
per polygynous husband. If mother’s rank is found to effect investments in children, the number
of women and children affected is substantial, because over 40% of married women are married
to polygynists, and 24% of children in the sample are children of polygynous marriages.6
Table 1: Measures of Polygyny
p proportion of husbands who have more than one wife

0.25

f proportion of all married women who are in polygynous marriages

0.41

m ratio of currently married women to currently married men

1.41

w number of wives per polygynist

2.3

proportion children ages 19 and under who are children of polygynous
marriages

0.24

Data: Côte d'Ivoire Living Standards Survey, 1985-1988 (pooled sample).

Table 2 presents summary statistics for polygynous households, where a polygynous household
is defined as one comprising at least one polygynous marriage. Statistics for one-wife
5

A random sample of approximately 1,600 households was interviewed each year. There was a rolling
panel element in the data; in the second, third and fourth years, 800 households from the previous year
were to be reinterviewed and 800 new households chosen (Venkatamaran, 1996, p. 1). The data are
pooled and the estimations control for year effects.
6
These figures are similar to those in multiple other sources and have not declined much over time (cf.,
Munro, et al., 2010), despite the fact that polygyny has been banned in Côte d’Ivoire since 1964
(Toungara, 1994).
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Table 2: Household Characteristics
1

2

Polygynous households
1,539 obs

household size
# children in household
under 19

4

Monogamous households
4,849 obs

5
Difference
(polyg. monog.)
point est.
(s.e.)

mean
[s.d.]

obs

mean
[s.d.]

obs

11.58
[5.91]

1,539

6.12
[3.79]

4,849

5.46
(0.26)

7.31

1,504

4.32

4,087

2.98

[4.35]
proportion rural

3

[2.78]

(0.19)

0.70
[0.46]

1,539

0.50
[0.50]

4,849

0.20
(0.03)

per capita expenditure

166.62
[102.42]

1,539

267.67
[233.93]

4,849

-101.08
(13.56)

age of head

51.58
[12.69]

1,539

45.46
[14.21]

4,848

6.11
(0.61)

43.59

1,530

36.08

3,561

7.51

age of senior/sole wife of
head

[12.21]
proportion heads with any
schooling

0.22

[12.50]
1,539

[0.42]
proportion senior/sole
wives of heads with any
schooling

0.07

0.46

1,514

13.28

1,359

0.35

1,242

22.48

0.56
20.30

973

0.39

3,365

27.13

-0.10
(0.02)

2,707

-7.02
(1.65)

2,046

[0.45]
973

-0.18
(0.02)

[33.86]

[0.42]
school expenditure for 1316s

3,513

[0.44]

[19.41]
proportion kids 13-16
currently enrolled

0.25

-0.18
(0.02)

[0.43]

[0.42]
school expenditure for 712s

4,843

[0.49]

[0.26]
proportion kids 7-12
currently enrolled

0.40

(0.55)

-0.04
(0.02)

2,046

-4.65

[35.94]
[46.22]
(2.48)
Notes: Differences are significant at the 1% level except school enrollment and expenditures for 13-16 year
olds which are significant at 10%.
n = 6,388 households (pooled sample): 1,588 households were interviewed in the first year, 1,600 in each
of years 2-4. Panel households supply two observations, each from a different year. Polygynous
Page 42

Institute for the Advancement of Developing Economies 2019

Journal for the Advancement of Developing Economies

2019 Volume 8 Issue 1

households are households which contain at least one polygynous marriage; all other households are
classified as monogamous.
Expenditures are in 1,000s of 1985 CFA francs and account for regional price differences using the
Combined Price Index (Venkatamaran, 1996). Means for number of children, proportions of children, and
school expenditures are conditional on children in the designated age group being present in the household.
School expenditure means are for all children in the age group, unconditional on being enrolled in school.
They include contributions to parent’s associations, uniforms and sports clothes, books and school supplies,
transportation to school, cafeteria, board and lodging, tuition and registration fees, and other.

___________________________
(“monogamous”) households are provided for comparison. About 25% of households contain at
least one polygynous marriage; the majority of polygynous husbands are heads of households, but
there are some non-heads. Polygynous households are larger, more likely to be rural, and have
lower per capita expenditure. The heads and wives of heads in polygynous households are less
likely to have any education. Children in polygynous households are less likely to be enrolled in
school from ages seven to sixteen, and expenditures on their schooling are lower on average.7
2.2 Summary Statistics: Senior and Junior Wives
Table 3 presents average characteristics of senior and junior wives in the sample.8 The number of
senior wives is greater than the number of polygynous households in Table 2 because a household
may contain more than one polygynous marriage. Column 5 shows the raw differences between
senior and junior wives. Senior wives are older on average than junior wives and their husbands
are about the same age. Senior wives are slightly less likely to have any schooling than junior
wives. However, the differences in column 5 are affected by the fact that senior wives are older
on average. To allow for age and cohort effects, the wife characteristic in each row is regressed on
an indicator for being a senior wife and a full set of indicators for age. The coefficient on the
indicator dummy and its standard error, presented in column 6, give the age-adjusted difference
between senior and junior wives and its significance. When the effects of age are controlled for,
we see that the junior wives’ husbands are older on average than senior wives’ husbands: if we
consider a senior wife and a junior wife who are of the same age, the senior wife's husband will be
about 8 years younger than the junior wife’s husband. Junior wives are slightly more likely to have
some education, significant at the 10% level.
7

In Côte d’Ivoire, primary education lasts for 6 years, starting at age 6. At the end of primary school,
students take a national exam to obtain a diploma (certificat d’étude primaires or CEPE) which is used
for selection of students for secondary schools. Lower secondary school (which will be referred to as
“middle school”) has 4 grades, upper secondary 3 grades (Sylla, 1992). Repetition of grades is common
(Den Tuinder, 1978, p. 280). School attendance was not compulsory during the time of the survey
(Tansel, 1997, Appendix).
8

The oldest wife was categorized as the senior wife and the younger wives as junior wives. The wives’
ages are probably good proxies for the dates they married the husband, because men seek younger women
to be later wives (Clignet & Sween, 1969). Marriage histories are not collected in the CILSS, but even if
marriage dates were available, they would not necessarily be more precise markers of wives’ rank,
because marriage was not a discrete event in Côte d’Ivoire during this period, but rather typically
proceeded in stages (Meekers, 1992). The sequencing of union formation events such as onset of sexual
activity, cohabitation, and marriage ceremony differed across women and there was no one event which
universally divided single from married women.
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Table 3: Wife Characteristics
1

2

3

Senior wives

4

Junior wives

5
Difference
(senior junior)
point est.
(s.e.)

6
Ageadjusted
difference
point est.
(s.e.)

mean
[s.d.]

obs

mean
[s.d.]

obs

Age

43.17
[12.32]

1571

34.20
[11.55]

2041

8.97***
(0.27)

--

Age of husband

50.98
[12.80]

1571

51.97
[12.58]

2041

-0.99***
(0.15)

-7.89***
(0.26)

0.07

1554

0.10

1998

-0.03***

0.02*

(0.01)

(0.01)

Proportion with any
schooling

[0.25]

[0.30]

Notes: * significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses
robust to heteroskedasticity and correlation within clusters. In the pooled sample, ranked by age, of 2,041
junior wives, 1,571 are second wives, 383 third, 70 fourth, 14 fifth, and three are sixth wives. Ageadjusted differences are obtained by regressing the wife characteristic on an indicator for being a senior
wife and a full set of age indicators.

2.3 Summary Statistics: Senior and Junior Children
Table 4 presents summary statistics for children of polygynous families in the CILSS data. The
current investigation focuses on children 13 to 16 years old, of an age to be attending middle
school. Both schooling expenditures (e.g., fees, books, and uniforms, as can be seen in Table 3)
and the opportunity cost of children’s time are higher at these ages than for primary-school-aged
children, so resource constraints are more binding.9 Older children were not examined because
during this time period very few students attended upper secondary school. The outcomes studied
are whether the child is enrolled in school; whether the child performs any work (market work or
home production); and the years of schooling attained by the child.
3 METHODOLOGY
The empirical specification is
𝐸 = 𝛽$ +𝛽% ∙ 1(𝑗𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑) + 𝛽6 ∙ 1(𝑗𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑) ∙ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 +
𝛽< ∙ 1(𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑) ∙ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 + 𝑋 ? ∙ 𝛽@ + 𝜀

(1)

E denotes the measure of investment in the child. The child’s mother’s rank is specified by an
indicator function which takes on the value of ‘1’ if the child’s mother is a junior wife, and is
otherwise ‘0’. The variable AgeDiff denotes the age difference between the household’s senior
wife and the youngest wife (referred to here as mothers’ age difference); it is interacted with both
9

The increase in opportunity cost of children’s time is predicted by economic theory, assuming that they
are more productive than are younger children.
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the junior child indicator and a senior child indicator, because its effects prove to be quite different
for junior and senior children. The omitted category relative to junior children is senior children,
so 𝛽$ represents the effect of being a senior child given the oldest and youngest wives in the
household are the same age (AgeDiff = 0). The vector X contains other characteristics of the child
and her household; the unreported controls are listed in the notes of Table 5.
Table 4: Child Characteristics
1

2

Children of senior
wives

Ages 13 to 16:
proportion currently enrolled
proportion who have obtained
CEPE, given they have 6 years of
education

3

4

Children of junior
wives

5
Difference
(senior junior)
point est.
(s.e.)

mean
[s.d.]

obs

mean
[s.d.]

obs

0.42
[0.49]

580

0.43
[0.50]

480

-0.01
(0.04)

0.65

268

0.61

216

0.04

0.48

[0.49]

(0.05)

any work (indicator)

0.37
[0.48]

573

0.40
[0.49]

475

-0.03
(0.04)

schooling (years)

5.14
[3.52]

580

5.08
[3.71]

480

0.59
(0.28)

0.49
[0.50]

837

0.48
[0.50]

911

0.02
(0.03)

0.21
[0.41]
2.66
[2.53]

833

0.20
[0.40]
2.55
[2.53]

911

0.01
(0.02)
0.10
(0.13)

0.71

620

0.66

437

Ages 7 to 12:
proportion currently enrolled
any work (indicator)
schooling (years)
Ages 13 to 19:
proportion children who have
obtained CEPE, given they have 6
years of education

837

911

0.05

[0.45]
[0.47]
(0.35)
Notes: All differences are not statistically significant at the 10% level. Expenditure in 1,000s of 1985
CFA francs. School expenditure means are unconditional on being enrolled.
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Table 5: Investments and Outcomes for Polygynous Children
Linear Probability Models
1
2

OLS

Dependent Variables:

Enrolled
(indicator)

Any Work
(indicator)

[mean]
Sample Age Range

[0.43]
13-16

[0.38]
13-16

3
Schooling
attained
(years)
[5.11]
13-16

-0.103**
(0.051)

0.059
(0.052)

-0.45
(0.37)

-1.70**
(0.85)

0.001

-0.002

-0.04

0.02

(0.004)

(0.003)

(0.03)

(0.05)

-0.012***

0.006**

-0.10***

-0.16***

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.03)

(0.05)

-0.190***
(0.035)

0.102***
(0.029)

-1.37***
(0.25)

-1.75***
(0.48)

0.387**
(0.164)

0.28**
(0.128)

2.82**
(1.23)

6.98***
(2.48)

R2

0.15

0.24

0.22

0.31

n

1,060

1,048

1,060

462

4.55
0.034

4.34
0.039

7.31
0.008

Junior child
Junior child*Mothers’ age
difference
Senior child*Mothers’ age
difference
Female
Constant

4
Schooling
attained
(years)
[5.75]
20-25

H0: Junior child*AgeDiff = Senior child*AgeDiff
F statistic
p-value

9.47
0.002

H0: junior child*AgeDiff = senior child*AgeDiff = 0
F statistic
7.83
2.96
7.60
6.26
p-value
0.001
0.054
0.001
0.003
Notes: * statistically significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
Standard errors in parentheses robust to heteroskedasticity and correlation within clusters.
Other regressors not reported include indicators for child age; whether the child's mother has any education,
the child’s “other mother(s)” has any education, and the child's father has any education; father's age;
mother's age; the number of co-wives in the family; the child's birth order among her father's children and
the child's birth order among her mother’s children; the number of children of the child’s own mother; the
number of children of the other wife who has the most children; household size; total household expenditure
and its square*10-6 in 1,000s of 1985 CFA francs. Regressions also include indicators for year and region
(rural regions East Forest, West Forest, and Savannah and urban regions Abidjan (the largest city and the
omitted category) and Other Cities, not Abidjan).
Column 2 has fewer observations than 1 or 3 because of missing values for the work questions. The results
in columns 1 and 3 are robust to using the slightly smaller sample of column 2.

4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Enrollment Results
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Table 5 presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions on outcomes, starting with an
indicator for being enrolled in school as the dependent variable in column 1.10 The negative and
significant coefficient on the junior child indicator indicates that junior children are 10 percentage
points less likely to be enrolled relative to their senior counterparts; however the coefficients on
the AgeDiff interactions show this effect is mediated by the mothers’ age gap. The coefficient on
Senior child*AgeDiff gives the effect on the probability of a senior child’s enrollment of adding
an additional year to the age difference between the household’s senior wife and the youngest wife,
while the coefficient on Junior child*AgeDiff gives this effect on the probability of a junior child’s
enrollment. There is a negative and significant coefficient on Senior child*AgeDiff (-0.012, pvalue = 0.00) and a positive (though small and insignificant) coefficient (0.001, p-value = 0.78)
on Junior child*AgeDiff. The end result is that senior children in a household with wives’ ages
tightly clustered indeed fare better than junior children; but the enrollment of senior children
relative to junior children declines in families with larger age gaps, as depicted in Figure 1 panel A.
The squares (circles) show the enrollment at each AgeDiff for senior (junior) children; the
diamonds show the difference; and the symbols are filled in for statistically significant differences.
The dashed-line figure (labelled “Fraction children with this value of mother’s age difference”)
shows the distribution of children across values of AgeDiff, to illustrate the relevant proportion of
the sample for each difference in enrollment.11 (Note the two different scales on the two y-axes:
the left y-axis, “Predicted fraction children enrolled,” is the scale for the results computed from
the regression coefficients Senior child*AgeDiff and Junior child*AgeDiff; the right y-axis
“Fraction children with this value of mothers’ age difference” is the scale for the relative frequency
of children for each age difference value.) As can be seen in the graph, the significant differences
in enrollment are at mothers’ age differences of 2 years or less, and 15 years or greater. The
crossover where senior children’s enrollment descends below juniors’ occurs at an age difference
of about 7.9 years; the average (median) age difference is 11.2 (10) years (author’s calculations
from the data). So, the effects are significant for a substantial subset of the children.
Referring back to equation (1), in order to fix ideas, the outcome E is designated as enrollment.
Now suppose there is an AgeDiff equal to 5 years. In this sample calculation it is assumed that the
junior (J) and senior (S) child are otherwise identical, so the effects of the variables in X will
difference out. The difference in enrollment between the senior and junior child:
C$ + 𝛽
C< ∙ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 + 𝑋 ? ∙ 𝛽
C@ + 𝜀) − (𝛽
C$ + 𝛽
C% + 𝛽
C6 ∙ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓+ 𝑋 ? ∙ 𝛽
C@ + 𝜀)
CB − 𝐸FE = (𝛽
(2)
𝐸
which, assuming that the characteristics X are identical, simplifies to:
C% + (𝛽
C< − 𝛽
C6 ) ∙ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓
CB − 𝐸FE = −𝛽
𝐸

(3);

and with the enrollment coefficients inserted,
CB − 𝐸FE = 0.103 + (−0.012 − 0.001) ∙ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓
𝐸

(4)

If AgeDiff = 5,
CB − 𝐸FE = 0.103 − 0.013 ∙ 5 = 0.103 − 0.065 = 0.038
𝐸

(5).

10

For ease of interpretation, ordinary least squares is used for the analysis of the binary variables Enrolled
(column 1) and Any Work (column 2); results are robust to using probit analysis.
11
This is the distribution of senior and junior children pooled; separate histograms for both groups look
extremely similar.
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Figure 1: Polygynous Children’s Time Use (Ages 13-16)
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Senior children are four percentage points more likely to be enrolled in school. However if
CB − 𝐸FE = 0.103 − 0.195 = −0.092, so senior children with mothers’ age
AgeDiff = 15, 𝐸
difference of 15 years are 9 percentage points less likely to be enrolled in school relative to the
junior counterparts. This is a substantial difference given that 43 percent of this sample is enrolled.
The coefficient for Junior child*AgeDiff is not statistically significantly different from zero in this
or the following regressions, and in columns two and three neither is the junior child indicator.
But in all specifications the Senior child*AgeDiff coefficient, the driver for the difference between
senior and junior child outcomes, is significant (Table 5, Senior child * Mothers’ age difference,
all columns). Additionally, the two lowest rows in Table 5 show results of F-tests for the null
hypotheses 1) that the coefficients on Junior child*AgeDiff and Senior child*AgeDiff are equal
and 2) that these two coefficients are jointly insignificant. These hypotheses are rejected at the
5% level for all four specifications.12
Turning to the other covariates in the enrollment specification: the coefficient for gender is
reported because it is known to be highly correlated with children's welfare measures in the
developing world (cf., Appleton, 1995 for Côte d’Ivoire). Gender has a large and significant effect:
girls are 19 percentage points less likely than boys to be enrolled.
Note that the following unreported coefficients, although they had statistically extremely
insignificant effects in all four regressions in Table 5, control for important aspects of the
polygynous household: 1) the number of children of the child’s mother and the maximum number
of children of the child’s other mothers: Because a wife’s value is directly related to her ability to
bear children (Clignet, 1970, p. 243), the number of children a wife has may affect the father’s
allocations to her, as well as indicating the level of need; 2) the child’s birth order among his fullsiblings (only his mother’s children) and among all his siblings (all of his father’s children):
Evidence suggests children of higher parity tend to receive lower parental investments (cf., Horton,
1988); 3) the number of wives of the child’s father: as a measure of the level of competition for
resources (Jankowiak, et al., 2005). Note also that these results are robust to limiting the sample
to children of marriages with only two co-wives (about two-thirds of the marriages); so the effects
are not driven by fathers with many wives. The wealthiest men are the ones who can afford to
take third and higher order wives (Jacoby, 1995); since the differences in allocations to senior and
junior children are not driven by these families, the differences are unlikely to be caused by a
wealth effect.
In unreported results, interaction terms were examined to determine if the effects of the unreported
controls differ for senior and junior children, as does the effect of the age difference between wives,
but they did not. Also investigated were characteristics of children’s family composition which
have been argued to affect child well-being in different contexts, without significant results: being
the oldest son (de Wolf, 1997); having an oldest sibling who is male (Dahl & Moretti, 2008);
having more brothers (Ssennyonga, 1997), more sisters (Garg & Morduch, 1998), or more older
sisters (Parish & Willis, 1993), given the size of the sibling set.

12

The exception is the Any Work specification, where the rejection of the null hypothesis that these two
coefficients are jointly insignificant has p-value 0.054.
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4.2 Results for Productive Activities and Educational Attainment
Turning to the remaining three outcomes in Table 5, we see they display patterns similar to that of
enrollment. In column 2 productive activities of children are examined; market work and home
production questions were asked about all household members aged seven and over
(Venkatamaran, 1996, p. 8). Any Work is an indicator equal to ‘1’ if the child is reported to have
worked in the market or at home in the past week.13 In Table 5 column 2 and Figure 1 Panel B we
see that the rank of the child’s mother affects whether he works or not in a pattern that mirrors that
of enrollment. At lower mothers’ age gaps, senior and children are essentially equally likely to be
working, but this likelihood increases for senior children as the age difference increases.14 The
difference becomes statistically significant at AgeDiff of 17 years, where the senior child is 6.5
percentage points more likely to be doing any work than the junior child (Figure 1 Panel B). Note
that girls are 10 percentage points more likely to do work in the market or home than boys (Table
5 column 2 row 4, coefficient 0.102), which suggests that working is not advantageous for these
children.
Results for educational attainment (number of years of schooling successfully completed) for this
sample and for an older group, aged 20-25, are shown in Table 5, columns 3 and 4, and Figure 2,
panels A and B. The older age group is examined because late enrollment and repetition of grades
was common during this period in Côte d’Ivoire (Ainsworth, 1996; Den Tuinder, 1978, p. 280),
so that many children completed their highest grade attained at later ages than would be expected
based on the grade. We see broadly the same results for both age groups: seniors’ years of
schooling attained decline with increasing mothers’ age difference. The deficit for senior children
is larger for the older group, suggesting the inequity accrues significantly over time.
5 CONCLUSIONS
This paper finds evidence that mother's rank affects allocations to children in polygynous
households. This evidence is consistent with the notion that co-wives compete for resources from
the husband and invest only in their own children, which can result in inefficient investments in
the household’s children.
Returning to the assumption that senior and junior children are equally likely to be productive in
school, making inequitable investments in their schooling inefficient, there is some suggestive
evidence that this assumption is plausible. Table 4 shows that senior and junior children are
equally likely to be enrolled in school at ages 7-12, and equally likely to obtain the Certificat
d'Études Primaires by ages 13-19, the diploma granted upon passing the primary school leaving
exam. The implication is that their academic abilities are equal, at least at this stage. The
regressions control for whether the child’s mother has any education, another possible indicator of
the child’s abilities. Unfortunately, other characteristics of the mothers such as the socioeconomic
status of their natal family or the bride price paid by the groom or his family at the time of marriage
(Clignet, 1970, p. 243) are unavailable.

13

Market work is defined as "the work on which you spent the most time during the past 7 days, even if
you were not paid for it;" home production as, "for example, cleaning the house, preparing meals for your
family, washing the family's clothes, buying food or clothes, fetching water or wood for cooking?"
14
Results for unreported separate regressions of market work and home production are very similar.
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Figure 2: Polygynous children’s educational attainment
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While the findings suggest inefficient investments in polygynous households in Cote d’Ivoire, the
results can also be interpreted as being consistent with some scenarios where allocations are
efficient. For example, there could be differential returns to education for children of an older
senior wife and of a much younger junior wife. Another possibility is that these allocations could
be efficient if there are compensating investments that are unobservable to us; for example,
Quisumbing (1994) illustrates for the Philippines that daughters receive less education, land, and
total inheritance from their parents than sons, but are compensated with nonland assets. It is
possible that Ivorian junior children traditionally receive investments not observable in this data,
although the ethnographic literature does not appear to support this notion. These scenarios cannot
be completely ruled out with the data available.
The finding of inefficient disparity in schooling investments speaks to a role for policies that will
incentivize more rational allocations to children, because the disparities potentially affect not only
the well-being of the polygynous children but also Côte d'Ivoire as a society. The results here are
a snapshot of a particular point in time, but it is unlikely that these investments have rationalized in
the intervening years. Polygyny remains prevalent in Côte d'Ivoire. Due to political unrest and
dependence on the prices of the main export commodities, coffee and cocoa, the Ivorian economy
has periodically surged and stagnated in the years since the CILSS survey, with no notable
advancement (World Bank, 2016;15 2015, p. 6). The poverty rate has increased dramatically, and
access to secondary education remains inequitable (World Bank, 2015, p. 8, p. 9).
Increasing women’s access to credit markets could enable credit-constrained wives to borrow to
invest in their children. Greater ability to borrow could also increase investment in their own selfemployment, trading or agriculture, which could give them more income and more clout in the
household.16 Another possibility would be to target directly the polygynous children’s school
attendance by paying mothers to keep them in school, similar to the pioneering Progresa program
in Mexico.17
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